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Essay
The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism
Thomas L. Shaffer*
There's a magnifying glass all cracked and broken, and when you
look at broken things through the lens you'd swear they'd turned
whole again.'
-Anne Tyler
Most of what American lawyers and law teachers call legal ethics is
not ethics. Most of what is called legal ethics is similar to rules made by
administrative agencies. It is regulatory. Its appeal is not to conscience,
but to sanction. It seeks mandate rather than insight.2 I argue here that
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A. 1958, University of
Albuquerque; J.D. 1961, Notre Dame Law School; LL.D. 1983, St. Mary's University of San
Antonio School of Law. I am grateful for the assistance of John Acuff, Mark H. Aultman, Milner S.
Ball, Roger C. Cramton, Jane N. Farrell, Monroe H. Freedman, Stanley Hauerwas, Steven J. Hobbs,
Louis W. Hodges, Burt Louden, Richard G. Marks, Stephen L. Pepper, Robert S. Redmount,
Nancy J. Shaffer, Mary M. Shaffer, and Margaret Williams.
1. A. TYLER, THE ACCIDENTAL TOURIST 278-79 (1985).
2. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 15 (1978) ("The typical professional
code of ethics presupposes that the profession has exclusive or substantial control over the process by
which professional competence is attained and verified. It presupposes ... that professional reputa-
tion must be maintained by good practice as a matter of professional survival."). The intellectual
roots of this type of "ethics" seem to be in the sociology of professions:
[Legal ethics is a] limited, bastardized version of ethics, an ethics culled from the ethos of
professionalism. It is not the ethics known by philosophers and theologians, but ... an
ethics formed from the normative conventions and practices of those who do professional
work. It is an ethics of work rather than an ethics of craft.
Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and Failure, 73 Ky. L.J. 937, 946 (1984-1985); cf. Gewirth,
Professional Ethics: The Separatist Thesis, 96 ETHICS 282, 300 (1986) (presenting an analysis of
"ethics" in a professional-client relationship that confuses ethics with professionalism).
For an example of writing on "professional ethics," see THE LEGAL PROFESSION: REsPONSI-
BILrrY AND REGULATION (G. Hazard & D. Rhode eds. 1985), an impressive collection of essays
compiled for law students. The book identifies its purpose as an inquiry into "the legal profession as
a serious academic subject," as opposed to the "formalist analysis, moralist polemics, and tepid
apologia" of the past. Id. at 1. Consistent with that purpose, the book includes examinations of "the
bar's social organization .... the premises underlying its regulatory efforts ... [and] the social,
economic, and ideological underpinnings of professional governance" from the perspective of "a
variety of intellectual disciplines." Id. In the book, faith, religion, and theology are relevant, if at
all, only as included in the discipline of history. Most of the "ethical" content of the book is regula-
tory, as distinguished from the philosophical ethics that interested, for example, Moses, Plato, Aris-
totle, Maimonides, Aquinas, Calvin, and Buber. Interestingly, the content is academically
interdisciplinary from every point of view but the religious. The editors write and select as if none of
their universities harbored schools of divinity, programs in theology, or departments of religious
studies.
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what remains and appropriately is called ethics has been distorted by the
weaker side of an old issue in academic moral philosophy. This "weaker
side" rests on two doctrines: first, that fact and value are separate; and
second, that the moral agent acts alone; as W.H. Auden put it,3 each of
us is alone on a moral planet tamed by terror.4 The influence of this
philosophical position deprives legal ethics of truthfulness and of depth.
As a principal example of the distortion, I use the case of lawyers em-
ployed by and for families, and by and for associations that use the meta-
phor of family to describe themselves.
Part I of the this Essay attempts to describe a different ethical the-
ory, opposed to the separations of fact from value and of individuals
3. W.H. AUDEN, THE AGE OF ANXIETY: A BAROQUE EPILOGUE 17 (1947).
4. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 55-87, 107-20 (2d ed. 1984); REVISIONS 1, 16 (S.
Hauerwas & A. MacIntyre eds. 1983); Wachbroit, A Genealogy of Virtues (Book Review), 92 YALE
L.J. 564 (1983); Wachbroit, Relativism and Virtue (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 1559 (1985). The
intellectual complaint is that the Scots and German Enlightenment, which enters our political and
ethical thought through political institutions that ignore or neglect the religious tradition, caused
moral philosophy to ignore, obviously, Moses and Jesus, and also, but not so obviously, Socrates and
Aristotle. Clearly, though, Socrates' and Aristotle's ethics of character are as incompatible with the
ethics of radical individualism as religious ethics. See Lehman, Finding Our Way Back, 29 AM. J.
JURIS. 229, 232-33 (1984).
Legal ethics as an academic discipline has begun recently to notice moral philosophy; unfortu-
nately, legal ethics also has begun to adopt moral philosophy's current biases. THE GOOD LAWYER
(D. Luban ed. 1984), is an example. Luban's book is a set of essays balanced between those who
accept and those who resist the distinction between fact and value and the individualism of the ethics
of autonomy. As the editor poses the issues, however, the book emphasizes the conflict between the
Kantian problem of universalism--something that MacIntyre finds unimportant, see generally A.
MACINTYRE, supra (proposing a modem Aristoltelian ethic)-and the sociological argument that a
professional role entails special morality, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 2-3; see also Elkins, supra
note 2, at 937 ("In structuring and defining human experience, the professions play an integral role
in the delineation of experience as good/bad, healthy/sick, or legal/illegal."); Gewirth, supra note 2,
at 282-86 (describing the thesis that professional duties differ from moral duties). Luban's dominant
concern as a moral philosopher who focuses on legal ethics is the difference between a procedural
and an agency view of the lawyer's role. That distinction, however, does not take seriously the
importance of organic communities, see infra note 8, particularly in that the Luban book discusses
procedures as bearing only on individuals, and agents as agents only for individuals. Luban thus
reveals himself as "an empiricist of a certain type, [for whom] the fundamental and basic condition is
human isolation, and relationship is a derivative fact which comes about only through inference."
Fackenheim, Martin Buber: Universal and Jewish Aspects of the I-Thou Philosophy, MIDSTREAM,
May 1974, at 46, 50 (emphasis in original). Luban's bias is evident even in his discussion of Judge
Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (holding
that certain fiduciary relationships demand a higher loyalty than "the morals of the market place").
THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 8-14. Cardozo argued that the association of two business partners is
organic, so that that the law will not allow a partner to keep a business opportunity to himself. Id at
9.
Another important example of this focus on academic moral philosophy in "interdisciplinary"
legal ethics is Stephen Pepper's essay, The Lawyer's Amoral Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities (Oct. 14, 1985) (unpublished manuscript), which was selected by academic judges in the
Association of American Law Schools as the best paper submitted in a competitive call for papers for
the Association's 1986 annual meeting. Cf. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 31-57 (1975) (dealing with, among other subjects, the "epistemology of legal ethics"); A.
GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1-2 (1980) (discussing the neces-
sity of special ethical norms in professional conduct).
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from the community. Part II considers a bar association ethical quan-
dary arising from what the modem ethics codes define as multiple-client
employment. Part III first considers the same quandary under Rule 2.2
of the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct,5 describing the lawyer
as intermediary, and then assesses the influences of moral philosophy on
that new rule. Part IV considers the quandary as it might have been
viewed in the practice of Louis D. Brandeis. Part V concludes the Essay
with an assessment of the ethics of radical individualism in terms of the
religious tradition's influence on legal ethics.
I. The Ethical Context
Ethics properly defined is thinking about morals. It is an intellec-
tual activity and an appropriate academic discipline, but it is valid only
to the extent that it truthfully describes what is going on.6 Those in con-
temporary ethics who concentrate on the importance of the truthful ac-
count argue first that fact and value are not separate-that stating the
facts is, as Iris Murdoch put it, a moral act, a moral skill, and a moral
art;7 and second, that organic communities8 of persons are prior in life
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1983).
6. J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETmIcs 84 (1966) (observing that ethics should put "a high pre-
mium on our knowing what's what when we act").
7. See Murdoch, On "God and Good" in THE ANATOMY OF KNOWLEDGE 233, 243-45
(1969). "Stating the facts," however, is not a prelude to ethics; it is ethics. It requires discipline to
eradicate from a description "the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which
prevents one from seeing what there is outside one." Id. at 244.
8. The difference between a community and an organic community is a common theme in
ethical writing, but the difference is suggested more often than it is defined. Maybe the distinction is
better suited to illustration than to definition. Writers who describe or employ the distinction seem
to have in mind three kinds of relationships among people that create organic communities.
First.-An organic community is created by people through the mutual practice of the virtues,
and through mutual support in the pursuit of the good. For Aristotle, such associations are both the
goal and the source of the virtue of friendship. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 271-72 (M.
Ostwald trans. 1962). (Aristotle also makes the more problematical claim that political order rests
on friendship, id. at 235-37, but that claim is not a claim about organic community.) Reinhold
Niebuhr often spoke of Britain (he probably meant England) as organic in this way. See R. Fox,
REINHOLD NIEBUHR 150, 170-74 (1985). Niebuhr also once attempted to define an "organic radi-
calism" for the Christian left in the United States. Id. at 172-73. In both cases, he seemed to associ-
ate "organic" with a communal practice of the virtues. An organic association also is possible
among those who practice a craft or a profession. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 4, at 175-83. "Or-
ganic" in this sense is a metaphor, because the relationships it describes are constructed, not or-
dained or established, as a part of the constitution or structure of the community.
Second.-An organic community is created, sustained, and redeemed by God. An example is
Israel, taken out of Egypt in the Exodus. See M. GOLDBERG, JEWS AND CHRISTIANS: GErrING
OUR STORIES STRAIGHT 103-04 (1985). The church in Christian ecclesiology is another example.
See id.; C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY IN AN AMER-
ICAN TOwN 37-42 (1986); S. HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER 59 (1981); Hauerwas,
The Church in a Divided World: The Interpretive Power of the Christian Story, 8 J. RELIGIOUS
ETHICS 55 (1980). "Organic" in this second sense sometimes is a metaphor (eg., in New Testament
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and in culture to individuals-in other words, that the moral agent is not
alone.
Exemplifying this second view committed to truthfulness is Anne
Tyler's kidnapped housewife, Charlotte, in the novel Earthly Possessions.9
When Charlotte reflects on her absent family, she understands and ex-
presses to herself the truth about her individuality; she mixes fact and
value, or rather, sees them correctly as mixed. She understands, through
the moral art of seeing, that she does not face terror alone, even though
she is alone: "I saw that all of us lived in a sort of web, criss-crossed by
strings of love and need and worry.... It appeared that we were all
taking care of each other, in ways an outsider might not notice." 10 Char-
lotte understands that to describe a fact is to describe a value. She sees
that, when the bell tols, and she is one of those who can hear it, it tolls
for her. Seeing and hearing are moral arts; when she is successful at
these arts, she hears the bell that says she is not an island.
In the practice of estate planning, for example, the facts that are
available for moral description are death and property: property seen in
the context of mortality, death seen in the context of owning things.11
references to the church as a body) and sometimes not (e.g., in references to the people Israel or to
the church as the people of God).
Third.-An organic community is recognized by people who discover a psychological or biolog-
ical commonality in one another. The term "organic" (or "organismic") has been used in this way
by humanistic psychologists. See, eg., A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 189-214,
222 (2d ed. 1968) (characterizing this "belongingness" as an aspect of self-actualization). Reinhold
Niebuhr also recognized this kind of community, noting in 1935 that the only "saving grace" of
European fascism was its feeling for "the organic character of society," a feeling produced by "out-
raged truth avenging itself" on the excesses of individualism. R. Fox, supra, at 170. Individualistic
psychologists apply the word "organism" to groups, e.g., C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY
481-533 (1951), thus implying that groups may have an organic life. Lewis Thomas perceives this
organic communal life as a matter even of biology. See L. THOMAS, THE LivEs OF A CELL 11-16,
81-87, 102-06 (1975). This sense of "organic" is metaphorical or not depending on the nature of the
characteristic that produces the commonality.
Whether "organic" is a metaphor or not, the term highlights the distinction between a collectiv-
ity and a community. A collectivity is mechanical; a community is organic. The Roman state, for
example, was in concept and operation "a mechanism wearing the mask of an organism, an organism
wearing the mask of the spirit," M. BUBER, ON JUDAISM 124 (1967), and "a contraction of the
strayed will to community," id. at 125. Judaism, by contrast, "rejects the 'We' of group egotism, of
national conceit and party exclusiveness, but it postulates that 'We' which arises from the real rela-
tionships of its components and which maintains genuine relations with other groups, the 'We' that
may say in truth: 'Our Father.'" Id. at 211 (emphasis in original). The collectivity (Le., chosen
affiliations in an I-It world) is justified only as necessary to sustain an organic community of I-You
relationships. M. BUBER, I AND THOU 124-26 (1970); see also infra note 48 (describing the relation-
ship of "organic" in a religious focus).
9. A. TYLER, EARTHLY POSSESSIONS (1978).
10. Id. at 182. The critical fact is that Charlotte thinks of herself as known, and therefore not
alone. Cf Psalms 139:3-12 (praising God as One who knows the poet intimately); A. HESCHEL,
BETWEEN GOD AND MAN: AN INTERPRETATION OF JUDAISM 57 (1959).
11. Death is a social, not only an individual, fact. Otherwise, the practice of estate planning
would lose significance. Property is also a social fact. As a consequence, property laws reflect moral
conclusions about the relationships among persons, and the importance of things for communities of
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The way death is seen in estate planning is ownership-that is why we
laugh at the cartoon that shows a fur-clad matron in the bank vault, the
family safety deposit box empty in front of her, saying, "He took it with
him!" The way ownership is seen in estate planning is in death-that is
the paradox (if not the humor) in those old trust-administration cases in
which the judges talk about long-dead settlors as people who own (pres-
ent tense) the property and can do with it what they want.12
What reconciles death with the ownership of property is the family.
The family is the lens through which we understand death as the death of
an owner, and property as something owned by dead people. The family
is the cracked magnifying glass that shows how things broken by discord
and death are whole. The family is normally why people bother with
estate planning-"normally" in the sense that, but for the family, estate
planning would not be a legal subject. 13 The family is the cultural focus
for the realization that estate planning is a worthwhile thing for people to
do, because it reflects the hope that none of us will die alone. The human
fact that is prior to the moral agency of which moral philosophy usually
speaks14 is the family; the moral art of description in the legal ethics of
estate planning is the skill to describe a family.
This art applies as well to associations that account for themselves
as if they were families. The skill for describing families holds moral
promise beyond families for the human harmonies that describe them-
selves with family metaphors. I was, for example, thanked recently for
patronizing "the Piedmont family," an incorporated airline company. I
was for years employed in "the Notre Dame family," a not-for-profit
Indiana corporation. I worship in what our pastor calls a parish family.
I am affected, as all of us are, by aggregations of businesses that refer to
themselves as families of companies. A lawyer for such an association is
invited to take seriously his client's use of the metaphor of family, and to
share in the hope that the members of the "family" have for one another
persons, including families. For analyses of these underlying moral conclusions, see Shaffer, The
Lawyer as Will Maker, in FAMILY SYSTEMS AND INHERITANCE PATTERNS 87 (1982); Shaffer, Slip-
pered Feet Aboard the African Queen, 3 J.L. & RELIGION 193, 198-99 (1985) [hereinafter Shaffer,
Slippered Feet]; Shaffer & Rodes, Law for Those Who Are to Die, in NEw MEANINGS OF DEATH 291
(H. Feifel ed. 1977).
12. E.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 270, 135 A. 555, 560 (1926); Broadway
Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882); In re Pulitzer's Estate, 139 Misc. 575, 580, 249
N.Y.S. 87, 93, supplemented, 140 Misc. 572, 251 N.Y.S. 549 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1931), aff'd, 237 A.D.
808, 260 N.Y.S. 975 (1932); Saunders v. Vautier, 49 Eng. Rep. 282, 282 (1841).
13. See, for example, the titles of casebooks, such as 0. BROWDER & R. WELLMAN, FAMILY
PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS (1965); J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSAC-
TIONS (2d ed. 1978).
14. See, eg., S. HAUERWAS, CHARACTER AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 18-34 (1975) (discussing
moral agency as the capacity to make choices that determine one's character).
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that none of us need die alone. In accepting or refusing this invitation,
the lawyer likely will act as a member of a professional association that
accounts for itself, as its clients try to do, with family metaphors.
II. The Case of the Unwanted Will
I use, in teaching legal ethics, a series of quandaries that were posed
in the American Bar Association Journal in 1979.15 One of these quanda-
ries describes John and Mary, a middle-aged couple with adult children.
John and Mary want their wills drafted before beginning a vacation trip
abroad. Based on John's instructions, the lawyer prepares a set of paral-
lel wills, each leaving all property to the surviving spouse, or, if both are
dead, to their children in equal shares. On a second visit to the law of-
fice, the lawyer presents the prepared wills to the couple, and John exe-
cutes his:
[T]he lawyer [then] suggests to John that he would like to be alone
with Mary before she signs. John withdraws to another office.
The lawyer asks Mary if the will is as she would have made it had
her husband not been present at the conference and if the will were
to be secret from her husband. She says no, that the will as drawn
contains several provisions that are contrary to her wishes, and
that she would change if her husband were not to know the ulti-
mate disposition of her estate. However, she says that she would
not be willing to precipitate the domestic discord and confronta-
tion that would occur if her husband were to learn that she had
drawn a will contrary to his wishes and in accordance with her
own desires. 16
You could say that the problem 17 never would have arisen had the law-
yer not talked to Mary alone.18 That description, of course, trivializes
the problem, but many law students, and some ponderers of legal ethics,
pose the quandary and the solution in just those terms. 19 From that
15. The Case of the Unwanted Will, 65 A.B.A. J. 484 (1979). I included an abridged version of
these quandaries in my textbook. See T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS 313 (1985).
16. The Case of the Unwanted Will, supra note 15, at 484.
17. To describe The Case of the Unwanted Will as posing a moral problem or quandary is to
make a moral judgment. See S. HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE 11-24 (1974); J. MCCLENDON,
BIOGRAPHY AS THEOLOGY 13-38 (1974); T. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS ch. 1 (1987);
Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, 80 MIND 552-55 (1971).
18. You also could say that the problem would have arisen differently had the lawyer felt it
necessary in addition to talk to John, alone.
19. The comments of George W. Overton in the A.B.A. Journal's discussion illustrate this triv-
ial analysis: "[Tlhe custom of separating spouses at execution of wills, although not uncommon, is
an anachronism, based on the notion that one spouse, presumably the husband, could coerce the
other into an unintended result .. " The Case of the Unwanted Will, supra note 15, at 486. John
C. Williams offered similar advice:
The root of the conflict is Mary's problem. She doesn't like the will that was discussed in
her husband's presence, but she doesn't want to disclose to him her dissatisfaction with it.
968
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viewpoint, the immediately noticeable premises for the two judgments
that there is a problem present, and that the problem is moral, are four.
First, a lawyer's proper employment is by or for an individual. Second,
employment by or for more than one individual is exceptional. Third, as
a consequence, multiple party employment is necessarily superficial. Fi-
nally, the means for protecting the superficiality (or, if you like, the
means for protecting the principle that employment is ordinarily and
properly by or for individuals) is ignorance of any facts known to one of
the individuals but not to the other.20
It follows from this typical analysis that the lawyer's moral mistake
was in talking to Mary alone. 21 Otherwise, Mary's secret intention never
would have come to his attention; her thoughts would be hidden, and
that is appropriate because John's thoughts are hidden. Now that the
lawyer has talked to Mary alone, he is in an impossible situation: he
cannot allow John to board the plane with the mistaken belief that Mary
agreed with what "they" had decided. 22 Nor, for the same reason, can he
help Mary to make a different will. 23 And, of course, he cannot allow
Mary to execute a will that does not do what she wants it to do.24
This principled analysis of The Case of the Unwanted Will fails be-
cause of what is prior to analysis: the moral art of description. The fail-
ure is sad and, I think, corrupting. It is corrupting, first, because it rests
on an untruthful account of what is going on. What is present in the law
This dilemma is Mary's and she should decide what to do about it. The lawyer, by meeting
privately with Mary, has permitted her to transfer the problem to him.
Id. at 488. Mr. Williams also noted that the lawyer's conduct violated professional standards. Id.
(citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101, 5-105, EC 5-1, 5-14 (1980)).
20. For example, Mr. Williams claimed,
It was a mistake for the lawyer to ask to meet privately with Mary before she signed her
will. By doing so, he invited Mary to speak "confidentially" with him and opened the door
to the dilemma that confronted him when Mary told him that she was dissatisfied with her
will.
Id. In Mr. Williams' judgment, this conduct violated MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY EC 5-14 (1980). Id.
21. Both commentators agreed. See id. at 486, 488.
22. That was Mr. Williams' view. Id. at 488 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILrrY EC 5-1 (1980) which states, "The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised...
solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising interests and loyalties."). Mr. Overton
disagreed in part: "[T]he lawyer, if questioned by John, cannot lie to him, although I do not believe
the lawyer has a duty to volunteer any information." Id. at 484.
23. See supra note 20. One of the commentators disagreed. Mr. Overton thought that the
lawyer could help Mary make a new will, provided that he told John that he had done so. The Case
ofthe Unwanted Will, supra note 15, at 486. Mr. Overton would not require the lawyer to disclose to
John the contents of Mary's new will. Id. at 484. For Mr. Williams, though, Mr. Overton's solution
did not provide "the full disclosure [to John] that the canons require." Id. at 488.
24. Both commentators agreed, although Mr. Overton would allow the execution of Mary's
unwanted will if the lawyer first explained to her that the will "is unquestionably her will.., and ...
[that] even if all their conversation were reproduced in court, it would not affect the validity of the
will." IL at 484.
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office is a family, and this one-lawyer-for-each-person way of first seeing
a moral quandary in this situation and then resolving the quandary with
the ethics of autonomy (the ethics of aloneness) leaves the family out of
the account.25 The analysis looks on Mary as a collection of interests
and rights that begin and end in radical individuality. Her affiliation
with her husband, and with the children they have made and reared, is
seen as a product of individuality(!), of contract and consent, of promises
and the keeping of promises-all the consensual connections that lonely
individuals use when they want circumstantial harmony. The employ-
ment of the lawyer is a result, then, of the links, the promises, the con-
tract, the consent, and the need for circumstantial harmony. The family
in the office is there only as the product of promise and consent. It is
relevant to the legal business at hand only because the (radical) individu-
als, each in momentary and circumstantial harmony with one another,
want it to be. The promise and the consent create the family.26
This description is offered by the legal ethics of radical individual-
ism. It is sad, corrupting, and untruthful. An alternative argument is
that thefamily created the promises, the contract, the consent, and the
circumstantial harmony-not the other way around. The family is not
the harmony; it is where the harmony (and disharmony) comes from. A
truthful description of The Case of the Unwanted Will is that the lawyer's
employer is a family. I suspect that that proposition will sound unusual
in legal ethics, but my argument would be ordinary in other contexts. It
treats, sees, and describes the family the way families are treated, seen,
and described in the stories we tell, in the television commercials we
watch, in the comics, and in our religious tradition. In these ordinary
ways of accounting to ourselves for ourselves, it is the family that causes
25. Mr. Overton's comment illustrates the untruthfulness of the account. It begins, "The first
question to be asked in all problems involving professional responsibility or ethics is 'Who is the
client?'... John probably presumes that the lawyer is his .... The lawyer probably accepted the
notion without clarification. The problem is that ... Mary is the client .... " Id. (emphasis in
original). Mr. Overton's perception denies the presence of a family (they are both the client), and
then creates a quandary (for the ethics of autonomy), out of his denial of the presence of a family.
26. Mr. Williams thus distinguishes between a "happily married husband and wife [who are
interested] in the continuity and development of their marital relationship" (Ia., a family), and "the
outcome of a particularly legal negotiation." The Case of the Unwanted Will, supra note 15, at 486.
The reconciliation of the two views of people in the law office-of continuity in the organic commu-
nity on the one hand, and a "particularly legal negotiation" on the other-rests, in his view, on the
outcome of the lawyer's probing for conflicts between the couple. The organic community (family)
is the client only if there are no conflicts. Describing a family in that way is comical. Mr. Overton
suggests that lawyers explicate the assumption "that each of you has given me your wishes" in the
joint interview for wills of spouses, but he would permit separate interviews "at the first meeting or
immediately thereafter." Id. That suggestion is not funny, but it also rests on the view that momen-
tary harmony creates the family. Its anthropology, therefore, is one of radical individualism. It
depends on the exercise of autonomous, individual decision-making power. Cf infra note 35 (sug-
gesting an alternative anthropology of the family).
970
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individuals to make the promises that begin, develop, and continue fami-
lies. The family causes people to seek human harmonies and, conse-
quently, to create more families, as well as associations such as
businesses, clubs, and professions, that account for themselves with fam-
ily metaphors.
The view of the family as organic and as prior to individuality is
ordinary in other parts of our culture. The Hebraic religious tradition,27
for example, regards the family as the nursery of the people of God.28
Anne Tyler's modem novels, 29 like Jane Austen's nineteenth-century
ones,30 tell deep and interesting stories about family and culture. The
truth here, however, is told in other and more ordinary places, including
stories of real and fictional lawyers31 and recent and popular novels that
describe espionage as a family trade,32 burglary as a (three-generation)
family business, 33 and organized crime as a family and a web of fami-
lies.34 And, because understanding others as members and constituents
of families generates a sense of shared experience, the final account of
racial justice in twentieth-century America might depend more than we
27. I use "Hebraic" where other writers use "Judeo-Christian." The single term implies that
the dominant American religious tradition is a single tradition, rather than two traditions that are
causally related to one another, or that happen to have something in common. See Shaffer, Jurispru-
dence in the Light of the Hebraic Faith, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 77, 78 n.4
(1984).
28. The significance of the family is evident particularly in the Jewish "master story," see M.
GOLDBERG, supra note 8, at 25-131 (the Jewish "master story" is in Exodus), in the social organiza-
tion of Israel after the death of Moses, when Israel was led by Joshua into the Promised Land. See
Joshua 41:7-17. God dealt with Israel family by family. At the end, when it came time to renew the
covenant between God and Israel in the new land, Joshua, in Israel, declared his allegiance in this
way: "I and my family, we will worship the Lord." Joshua 24:15 (New English Bible). Joshua
"spoke not as leader to his people but, in the cultural context ... to all present as families .... He
articulated the truth that the covenant with God exists directly between God and the most rudimen-
tary social unit." McAlister, Exodus and Community, SOJOURNERS, Mar. 1986, at 36, 37.
Family physicians describe their patients and their power in communities in this Hebraic way;
they care for families "in the larger sense." See Nemethy, Doctor A Profile of Contemporary Rural
Practice, VERMONT LIFE, Winter 1984, at 50, 53. See generally McPhee, A Reporter at Large: Heirs
of General Practice, NEW YORKER, July 23, 1984, at 40 (presenting anecdotal evidence that doctors
in rural communities counsel their patients as families, and as in families).
29. E.g., A. TYLER, DINNER AT THE HOMESICK RESTAURANT (1982); A. TYLER, MORGAN'S
PASSING (1980); see also supra notes 1, 9 and accompanying text (describing other Tyler novels).
30. For a discussion of Austen's novels, see A. MACINTYRE, supra note 4, at 169-74; J. WHITE,
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 163-91 (1984).
31. See, eg., T. SHAFFER, supra note 15 (discussing Harper Lee's Atticus Finch; Louis Auchin-
dloss's Henry Knox and Mario Fabbri; Arthur Train's Ephraim Tutt; George V. Higgins's Jerry
Kennedy; and others, and including biographies of Louis D. Brandeis, Farrington Reed Carpenter,
Fanny Holtzmann, Justine Wise Polier, and others).
32. See, eg., J. CARROLL, FAMILY TRADE (1982).
33. See, eg., V. PATRICK, FAMILY BUSINESS (1985).
34. E.g., Protecting the Family, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 52. According to that article, organized
crime families excuse lawyers' bribery, destruction of physical evidence, and betrayal of clients,
under an ethic of loyalty in which the metaphor of family is the organizing insight. Thus, "to do the
right thing means to protect the family .... It's a way of life." Id.
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suppose on the black-family situation comedy on network television.35
III. Lawyer as Intermediary
The recently adopted Model Rules of Professional Conduct describe
situations in which the lawyer acts as an "intermediary. '36 This formu-
lation is remarkably ambiguous for a case such as The Case of the Un-
wanted Will. The Model Rules can be read to support the perception I
treat as inadequate, untruthful, and corrupting-that is, the perception
based on radical individualism. They can also be read to support the
argument for taking deeper account of the family as the creator, rather
than the product, of the human harmonies that are presented to lawyers
in estate planning, and in legal work for associations that account for
themselves with family metaphors.
The new rule offers a set of procedures for accepting employment
from two or more individuals. The rule rests on the assumption that
employment by individuals is the norm; it has to provide a behavioral
checklist to make exceptional, multiple-client employment possible:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implica-
tions of the common representation, including the advantages and
risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and
obtains each client's consent to the common representation;3 7
35. My view of the family is therefore anthropological. It is not normative, in the sense in
which modem moral philosophy usually separates the normative from the descriptive. The family is
not, always and everywhere, good teleologically; nor is it always and everywhere good for its mem-
bers. The family is part of the way people are. (When the family is seen as ordained by God,
perhaps it is good in an ontological sense, in the way that government, according to St. Paul, is good.
See Romans 13:1-7).
My view of the family follows the second of the three views about "organic community" enu-
merated supra note 8. To describe, for example, black Americans in families therefore expresses a
common experience that helps white Americans to understand black people, and that perhaps helps
black people to understand themselves, in the way Anne Tyler's white characters come to under-
stand themselves in families. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. James Cone makes a similar
argument, theologically, in reference to black churches in America. See J. CONE, MY SOUL LOOKS
BACK 57 (1982).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1983). I am consulting this rule in
two versions. The first is the form in which it originally was presented to the profession for com-
ment: MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinaf-
ter MODEL RULES (PROPOSED)]. The second is the form in which it finally was adopted by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association: MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 2.2 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
37. The 1981 draft read "discloses to each client the implications of ... and the effect on
attorney-client privileges." MODEL RULES (PROPOSED), supra note 36, Rule 2.2. The phrase "mul-
tiple clients" was favored in the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5, EC 5-
15 to -19 (1985). Rule 2.2, however, favors "common representation," a choice that might support
the argument that an organic community, or a "situation," can be a client. "Multiple client employ-
ment" is not a common Code phrase, but it seems to express the notions that (1) prototypical lawyer
employment is employment by an individual and (2) employment for more than one person on the
same matter is, in some sense, employment by each of them. See generally supra note 25 (quoting
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(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved
on terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client
will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter
and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of
any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful;
and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representa-
tion can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on
other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with
each client concerning the decisions to be made and the considera-
tions relevant to making them, so that each client can make ade-
quately informed decisions. 38
(c) The lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the cli-
ents so requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a)
is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not con-
tinue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the sub-
ject of the intermediation. 39
The Model Rules, unlike predecessor codes, canons, essays, and res-
olutions, eschew descriptions of morals. The authors and advocates of
the rules have rooted out both the language and the discipline of ethical
reasoning; these rules are not ethics but instead a set of regulatory man-
dates and prohibitions. As a consequence, the proposed rule on the law-
yer as intermediary need not reveal its lonely-individual premise, if it has
one. I think that Rule 2.2 does have a lonely individual premise, the
premise of modem moral philosophy. The Rule's authors did assume
that the normal employment of a lawyer is employment by a single indi-
vidual,4° and that, therefore, the profession needs a rule for the excep-
tional case in which a lawyer is employed by or for a group of
individuals.4 1
one lawyer's assertion that the first issue in legal representation is determining who is the individual
client).
38. The 1981 draft read "shall explain fully to each client the decisions to be made," rather
than "shall consult with each client concerning the decisions." MODEL RULES (PROPOSED), supra
note 36, Rule 2.2.
39. MODEL RULES, supra note 36, Rule 2.2. The 1981 draft read, "if the conditions stated in
paragraph (a) cannot be met or if in the light of subsequent events the lawyer reasonably should
know that a mutually advantageous resolution cannot be achieved." MODEL RULES (PROPOSED),
supra note 36, Rule 2.2. This circumstantial test for commonality is radically different in moral
implication from the test that gives any member of the group the power to end the group's common
character as client.
40. MODEL RULES, supra note 36, Rule 2.2. The 1981 draft also prohibited the lawyer from
continuing to represent one of the clients "unless doing so is clearly compatible with the lawyer's
responsibilities to the other client or clients." MODEL RULES (PROPOSED), supra note 36, Rule 2.2.
41. Geoffrey Hazard describes this image of the lawyer in a lonely, individualistic, tamed-by-
terror world:
The picture of the lawyer.., is that of a lone practitioner who must judge for himself
what is right while engaged in intense competition .... The controls on his conduct...
are almost entirely those of self-governance .... At the same time his vocational situation
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It seems unlikely, for example, that the people who drafted and
adopted the Model Rules would encourage a lawyer to exert herself to
keep a client group together. The safer recourse, should fissures appear
in the human harmony that first allowed the lawyer to be lawyer for the
group, is to stand back, let things fall apart, and then take professional
refuge from the falling debris by withdrawing from the representation. If
the Rule had been invoked in The Case of the Unwanted Will, the lawyer
would at any rate have learned, as he protected himself from the debris,
not to focus attention on a will-making wife in the absence of her
husband.
The comment to Model Rule 2.2 is more encouraging to those who
might want to invoke the Rule for the proposition that families are prior
to individuals, and, invoking it, to suggest that a lawyer should exert
herself to describe the family and maybe to keep it together. When a
lawyer follows the rule, she seeks "to establish or adjust a relationship
between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis."42
None of the relationships given as examples is explicitly a family, or even
a couple, married or not. Nevertheless, mediation is one of the profes-
sional skills mentioned; the development of mutual interests is one of the
goals mentioned; the avoidance of complication is one of the benefits
claimed for the employment; and situations "where the clients' interests
are substantially though not entirely compatible" are given as prototypes
of justified multiple-client employment.43
The comment can be read to describe families as we know them
from our stories. If the comment to the Rule were invoked in The Case
of the Unwanted Will, I see the possibility of an argument that the lawyer
is lawyer for the family, and that what the Rule does is provide for the
representation not of lonely individuals in circumstantial harmony, but
of the harmony itself, or even of the communal source of the harmony."4
The moral premise of the regulatory rule with its behavioral check-
... is one of dependency and vulnerability. Control of client misconduct will result, it is
assumed, because conscience will surmount circumstance.
Hazard, Conscience and Circumstance in Legal Ethics, I Soc. REsP.: JOURNALISM L. MED. 36, 44-
45 (1975). He is quoted in the business press as equating law-firm corruption with the loss of skepti-
cism toward clients. See A Question of Integrity at Blue-Chip Law Firms, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 7,
1986, at 76, 80.
42. MODEL RULES, supra note 36, Rule 2.2 comment (emphasis added).
43. Id (emphasis added). This language is cautious and regulatory. Compare Martin Buber's
description of a marriage: "The You that is I for neither of them." M. BUBER, supra note 8, at 95.
The husband or wife thus is an other-not a mirror.
44. Undermining the usefulness of the comment to Model Rule 2.2 is the statement in the
preamble to the Model Rules that the comments "do not add obligations to the Rules but provide
guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules." MODEL RULES, supra note 36, scope. The
comments provide regulatory, not moral, guidance. Nevertheless, courts previously have given coer-
cive effect to moral admonitions such as the Ethical Considerations of the Model Code of Profes-
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list is, I think, that the truly important and deep things in human life are
individual and singular; they are matters of autonomy.45 To put it an-
other way, the highest good I can seek for a person on whom I focus my
beneficence is that he be free-and free here means self-ruling and radi-
cally not committed.46 The things that people share under this logic are
relatively superficial; they are the harmonies that radically autonomous
individuals choose to have. Employment by a group of persons is possi-
ble only if the lawyer stays with chosen harmonies. The employment is
imperiled if the lawyer intrudes on these individualistic choices. If the
employment will necessarily intrude on these choices, then the radically
individualistic nature of the persons who are client(s) requires separate
lawyers for each individual.
The competing premise-perhaps supported by the comment to the
Rule-is that human harmonies do not rest on the choices of autono-
mous individuals; they rest instead on communities. Human harmonies
are not chosen but given. As Abraham Joshua Heschel put it,
[T]he self is a monstrous deceit... something transcendent in dis-
guise .... I am endowed with a will but the will is not mine; I am
endowed with freedom, but it is a freedom imposed on the will.
Life is something that visits my body .... The essence of what I
am is not mine.47
Organic 48 communities such as families are prior to individuals.
sional Responsibility. See R. ARONSON & D. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 27-29
(1980). Courts eventually may give the same weight to the comments to the Model Rules.
45. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 4, ch. 1; A. GOLDMAN, supra note 4.
46. See Dworkin, MoralAutonomy, in MORALS, SCIENCE, AND SOCIALITY 156 (1978) (explor-
ing six meanings for the proposition, "A person is morally autonomous if and only if his moral
principles are his own"); see also infra note 62 (detailing Dworkin's criticism of that proposition on
the grounds that it is either trivial or objectively false).
47. A. HECHEL, supra note 10, at 62. The ethical consequence of Heschel's statement is a
truer regard for personhood, as opposed, perhaps, to individuality. The influential and even trendy
enterprise described as "alternative dispute resolution" is one institution that depends on the denial
of aloneness-that is, on thefact that a dispute is a fractured commonality, that the commonality is
stronger than, and prior to, the fracture. See McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J.
1660, 1664 (1985). The denial (or, perhaps, the overcoming) of aloneness is a matter of imagina-
tion-the ability to see another life as analogous. See P. ROSE, PARALLEL LIVES: FIVE VICTORIAN
MARRIAGES 237 (1983) (quoting from George Eliot's memorial stone in Poet's Corner in Westmin-
ster Abbey: "The first condition of human goodness is something to love; the second something to
reverence.").
48. Without denying my anthropological argument, see supra note 35, it is fairly clear that
focus on the organic often, if not necessarily, is a focus from the religious tradition, see supra note 8.
Looking at professional ethics from the religious tradition does not necessarily imply, though, con-
sideration of God or ethical propositions in a way that academic categories identify narrowly as
theological. Philosophy, from Plato through Kant, also considers God. The difference that focus on
the organic can make is not the difference between philosophy and theology but the difference be-
tween seeing God as subject rather than an object. The religious tradition "does not understand
[knowledge of God] as a noetic relation of a thinking subject to a neutral object of thought, but
rather as... the genuinely reciprocal meeting in the fullness of life between one active existence and
another." M. BUBER, ECLIPSE OF GOD 32-33 (1952). In the Hebraic tradition, "genuinely recipro-
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The lawyer in The Case of the Unwanted Will, for example, did not err in
turning his attention to Mary, in John's absence. (Nor would it have
been a mistake to turn his attention to John, in Mary's absence; if even-
handedness is important, it would have been more evenhanded to talk
privately with each of them.) The deep things to be found out about
John and Mary, in particular the deep things involved in their will mak-
ing, are family things.49 Inquiring into deep family things is not only
tolerated, but it is required by common representation, because the client
is the family. Any other description is incomplete and, thus, untruthful
and corrupting. 50 If an adequate account of what is going on in the fam-
ily (to the extent that it has to do with their will making) requires talking
to either or both parents alone, then talking to them alone is appropriate.
If the family is well represented, it (that is, each person in it) will learn
how to take Mary's purposes into account, because Mary is in the family.
Giles Milhaven demonstrates my point in an analysis of Bernard
Malamud's novel Dubin's Lives.51 In part, Dubin's Lives is the story of a
man who has to choose between his wife and his mistress, and chooses
his wife. He chooses not because he loves his wife rather than his mis-
tress; he loves both. Rather, as Milhaven says, he loves a life. In "the
Jewish matchmaking tradition, a man and woman ... will in marriage
. .. come to know and love each other's lives. Leaving father and
mother, they will become one flesh.., in their spontaneous, enduring
desire to keep sharing lives."'52 Dubin's story denies "the assumption
cal meeting" is prototypically the meeting of God and community. See E. BERKOVrrS, MAJOR
THEMES IN MODERN PHILOSOPHIES OF JUDAISM 111 (1974); M. GOLDBERG, supra note 8, at 103-
04.
The other side of the difference I mean to identify in this Essay tends away from community.
The (modem) philosophical viewpoint "is the product of a consciousness which conceives of itself as
autonomous and strives to become so." M. BUBER, supra, at 32. The religious tradition not only
teaches something else, it also announces a moral objection to the striving for autonomy, on both
religious and philosophical grounds, as idolatrous, as "the worship of freedom for its own sake," id.
at 119-20, and as "[plower without faithfulness"-that is, the immoral use of persons as means to an
end. M. FRIEDMAN, MARTIN BUBER: THE LIFE OF DIALOGUE 119 (1955). Thus Buber said that
the price the West paid for the political consequences of the Enlightenment was the decay of organic
forms of life such as family, village, and union in work. See id. at 123. We are left with the alienated
world described by Franz Kafka. See M. BUBER, ON JUDAISM, supra note 8, at 131-32.
49. If will making is an example of "family things," then that fact also binds lawyers. The
object of professional life is the goodness, not the freedom, of clients. Freedom is a necessary condi-
tion for goodness, but it is not the object of the enterprise. See Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Servanthood, 8 Soc. RESP.: JOURNALISM L. MED. 34, 44 (1982); White, The Ethics of Argument:
Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 849, 873 (1983).
50. See M. GOLDBERG, supra note 8, at 103 ("[A]ny description of human existence that denies
or underestimates the full repercussions of the community's life for the life of an individual offers an
account which is in the last analysis no more than a fairy tale.").
51. B. MALAMUD, DUBIN'S LIVES (1979).
52. Milhaven, An Experienced Value of Marital Faithfulness in Dubin's Lives, 12 J. RELIGIOUS
ETHICS 82, 94-96 (1984) (emphasis added); see supra note 43.
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that morality is something we create through individual choice rather
than the shaping of our lives through the disciplined discovery of the
good."53
To illustrate this shaping of lives in a disciplined discovery of the
good, suppose in The Case of the Unwanted Will some further facts about
Mary's purposes.54 One of the couple's sons, Henry, was married for ten
years to, and is now divorced from, a woman named Susan. Henry and
Susan had children who now live with Susan, and Henry lives alone.
John and Mary, however, remain fond of Susan and, despite the divorce,
continue to be friendly with her. The lawyer's questions to John and
Mary have brought this affection to the surface, but John, as is typical,55
thinks of property and family together, and Susan no longer is in the
family. During the joint interview, Mary sits silent while John says that
they want "Henry's share" to go to Henry and, if Henry is dead, to his
children. In the cases of the other children of John and Mary, says John,
the child's share is to go to the child's spouse. What Mary says to the
lawyer when they are alone, however, is that she wants her will to pro-
vide for Susan. Mary wants some of her family's property to be available
for Susan, after Mary dies, when what is left of Mary will be in her fain-
53. S. Hauerwas, How Christian Universities Contribute to the Corruption of Youth: Church
and University in a Confused Age, (Feb. 1986) (unpublished manuscript). Buber echoes the point:
[I]nstitutions of... personal life cannot be reformed by a free feeling (although this is also
required). Marriage can never be renewed except by that which is always the source of all
true marriage: that two human beings reveal the You to one another. It is of this that the
You that is I for neither of them builds a marriage.
M. BUBER, I AND THOU, supra note 8, at 95.
54. It is important to hypothesize something about Mary's purposes. (The A.B.A. Journal's
discussion did not.) Otherwise, she is a problem rather than a person. One could suppose, for
example, a Gilbert-and-Sullivan plot, in which Mary has borne a child early in life, before she met
John. The child has been adopted or is otherwise being cared for by others (and is therefore in
another family). Mary nevertheless wants to provide for him in her will.
A friend of mine who is in full time law practice suggests another possibility:
I had a case where each spouse had children by a prior marriage. All of the children
were adults. I prepared a rough draft of their wills in which they were treating each other's
children equally with their own. One of the wife's two children then died. This had very
unsettling effects and must have caused both of them to reexamine a lot of things. I am not
sure of the thought process that took place, but each person then individually came to see
me about the finalization of each person's will. In his will he disinherited two of his three
children, leaving his estate to one child and the remaining child of his wife. The wife was
not present when the husband made these decisions. The wife came to see me at a later
time. Her husband had shown her his copy of his will. In her will, she left property to her
child, the surviving spouse of her dead child, and her grandchild. In addition she also left
property to her husband's children equally (including the two children her husband had
disinherited). She also included a trust so that upon her death, her husband would be
provided for, but would not have control over the assets .... She was not going to show
him a copy. Perhaps she was looking through the cracked magnifying glass, seeing his and
her family as a whole.
55. See Shaffer, Slippered Feet, supra note 11, at 196.
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ily. Mary will be there, not because of a fictional notion about owner-
ship, but because Mary did not die alone.
It is interesting to note how the narrative force of that statement
about Mary's property changes as the case is described differently. Does
Mary dispose of her property, her family's property, her husband's prop-
erty, or her children's property? The point is that seeing and saying are
moral and legal acts, and moral and legal arts.56 The law is a language;57
legal authority will support any one of these ways of speaking of this
property, and any of the statements is a moral judgment, as, indeed, the
word "property" is a moral judgment.5 8
Mary's conception of the family includes Susan, both now and after
Mary dies. Mary sees her death and her property together; the lawyer's
questions have caused her to do that. The lawyer's skill includes the
moral art of seeing, of "knowing what's what when we act,"5 9 and of
training his client in that moral art.60 Mary looks at her property and
her death through the broken magnifying glass of her family, and now
she sees Susan in her family. The lawyer has caused her to remember to
see in this way through the broken magnifying glass that is her family.61
The inquiry by the lawyer turned up this more truthful description of the
family. Consequently, the lawyer's inquiry was a moral act, and the ex-
ercise of a moral art. To the extent that the quandary calls for a judg-
ment about what the lawyer has already done, my argument is that he
has begun to do a good thing. It is a good thing because it is a more
truthful description of the reality that is the goal of the lawyer's work.62
56. See supra notes 7 and 12.
57. See J. WHITE, supra note 30, at 231-74.
58. See id. at 263-7 1; White, The Conversational Process of the Law, LAw QUADRANGLE
NOTES, Summer 1985, at 26, 30, 31.
59. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 4. White, in a similar argument, says Jane Austen trains her readers in
kindness. See J. WHITE, supra note 30, at 190-91.
61. This is not "the outcome of a particularly legal negotiation," see supra note 26, but an
exercise in description, or the product of a vision of reality, see supra note 17.
62. To see Mary as self-ruling (autonomous) and essentially alone is untruthful. Dworkin ar-
gues that the formulation of the principle of moral autonomy is either trivial or false. See Dworkin,
supra note 46, at 57-58. The principle of autonomy also is paradoxical:
Consider the statement that moral agents ought to be autonomous. Either that statement
is an objectively true statement or it is not. If it is, then there is at least one moral assertion
whose claim to validity does not rest on its being accepted by a moral agent. If it is not,
then no criticism can be made of a moral agent who refuses to accept it.
Id. at 161-62. Further, it is ahistorical and a false anthropology:
From the temporal perspective the commitments of my earlier self must bind (to some
degree) my later self. It cannot always be open for the later self to renounce the commit-
ments of the earlier self. This implies that even self-imposed obligations create a world of
'otherness'-a world which is independent of my (current) will and which is not subject to
my choices and. decisions. The distance between my earlier and later selves is only quan-
titatively different from that between myself and others.
Id. at 164-65. It is unfactual, leaving culture out of account: "That I have obligations of gratitude to
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It is more interesting, though, if The Case of the Unwanted Will
must be seen as a quandary, to make it a quandary about what the lawyer
should do now that the exercise of this moral art of seeing has described
reality in such a way that the employment itself is a problem. Either
multiple-client employment is no longer possible, or we must change our
rule about when multiple-client employment is possible. The estate plan-
ning issue, therefore, is whether this family is equal to the truth of what it
is. The legal ethics issue is whether this lawyer, employed by this family
(which is now seen in this broken-magnifying-glass way), is to continue
to have anything to do with the truth of what this family is.
I understand the objection that my way of describing the family, as
the client, is patriarchal and therefore untruthful or unfair to married
women. It is undoubtedly the case that much of conventional legal ethics
is sexist. It is important nevertheless to identify the roots of the sexism,
and to describe an ethic that is adequate to deal with sexism without
being untruthful. I argue that the roots of sexism in legal ethics do not
have to do with the family, or with the view of organic community that I
urge here, but instead with the tellers of our stories. Fairness requires
not stories that describe women outside of families, because our stories
already say that that sort of story would be false,63 but women's stories
about families. With all our patriarchal self-deception, we property law-
yers do seem able to accept the truth when it is described well. To know
the truth, we need the stories told by Jane Austen, George Eliot, Anne
Tyler, and family biographers such as Phyllis Rose" and Lis Harris6 5-
not as a substitute for family stories told by Trollope and Faulkner, but
in addition to and in enlargement of their stories.
IV. The Communal Context
A. The Lawyer for the Situation
The proposed ABA rule on the lawyer as intermediary apparently
my aged parents, of aid to the stranger attacked by thieves, of obedience to the laws of a democratic
and just state, of rectification to those treated unjustly by my ancestors or nation are matters that are
independent of my voluntary commitments." Iad at 165. Dworkin concludes his criticism: "It is
only through a more adequate understanding of notions of tradition, authority, commitment, and
loyalty, and of the forms of human community in which these have their roots, that we shall be able
to develop a conception of autonomy free from paradox and worthy of admiration." Id at 170.
Stephen Pepper is attempting this "more adequate understanding" in legal ethics. See Pepper, supra
note 4.
63. See Hauerwas, supra note 8, at 63.
64. P. RosE, supra note 47.
65. L. HARRIS, HOLY DAYS: THE WORLD OF A HASIDIC FAMILY (1985); see also M.
GOLDBERG, THEOLOGY AND NARRATIVE, 13-15 (discussing C. CHRIST, DIVING DEEP AND SUR-
FACING 137 (1980)); Gilbert, From Our Mothers' Libraries-Women Who Created the Novel, N.Y.
Times, May 4, 1986, § 7 (Book Review), at 30.
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derives from Geoffrey Hazard's description of stories from the private
law practice of Louis D. Brandeis.66 Brandeis, however, did not say law-
yer "as intermediary"; he said lawyer "for the situation. '67 Brandeis
first used the singular word "situation" to describe a bankruptcy case
involving a family business. This pattern of thought (and of practice), no
doubt, was evident also in Brandeis' estate planning and probate and
trust work for the Warren family. If his work is divided according to the
norm that a lawyer is employed by the individuals in a family rather than
by a family as a whole, then at one time or another Brandeis was lawyer
for the senior Mr. Warren (founder of the family business), for Mr. War-
ren's wife, for Mr. Warren's estate, for the testamentary trust established
in Mr. Warren's will, for temporary entities created (through Brandeis'
work) to manage the family business, and for individual members of the
family in the second generation. 8 Brandeis first used the word "situa-
tion" in the Senate hearings on his nomination to the Supreme Court,
when he was defending himself against the charge that his representation
during the bankruptcy of a family business demonstrated that he did not
know who his client was.69 In other words, Brandeis had violated the
norm that a lawyer represents only individuals, except on extraordinary
and necessarily superficial facts. He was asked who (singular) his client
was. And, in answer, he chose the word "situation."
Joseph Fletcher later used the word "situation" to advocate a mod-
em version of contextual religious ethics, 70 an ethics that puts particular
stress on being truthful about what is going on, and that bases moral
judgment on the context described in this truthful way.71 The key point
of distinction for present purposes is that contextual ethics denies the
distinction between fact and value. When Brandeis used the word that
Fletcher would use later-situation-he accomplished several things. He
66. G. HAZARD, supra note 2, at 58-68.
67. See Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965).
68. See id. at 699-703, 708-09.
69. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of
Louis D. Brandeis to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 64th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 287 (1916).
70. See J. FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 26-37.
71. See supra note 4. Fletcher made his argument within a modem school of ethics that exerts
almost as much influence over religious ethics as Immanuel Kant's ethics of autonomy exerts over
academic philosophical ethics. I mean the "school" (now in at least its fifth intellectual generation)
of H. Richard Niebuhr of the Yale Divinity School, which is often identified as one part of a modem
"ethics of responsibility." See A. JONSEN, RESPONSIBILITY IN MODERN RELIGIOUS ETHICs 140-46
(1968). See generally H.R. NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF (1963). Fletcher, Hauerwas, and
McClendon, see supra note 17, belong to that school, as does Goldberg, see supra notes 8, 65. The
Niebuhr school's influence is manifest more in religious ethics than in academic moral philosophy,
although the moral philosophers Pincoffs, see supra note 17, Murdoch, see supra note 7, and
MacIntyre, see supra note 4, sympathize with much of it.
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made a moral judgment about what was going on in the Senate hearings
concerning a moral judgment he had made years earlier when confronted
with the fact that the human harmony he had perceived or created was
falling apart. Brandeis had decided originally that the human harmony
was sufficient to be his client, and might have been (as the Warren family
was) something prior even to the people he met when he decided that,
together and not alone, they could be his client.
Brandeis thus looked at what he had done through a broken magni-
fying glass such as the Warren family, and he approved of it. The hound-
ing senators failed in the attempt to make him ashamed of himself.72 He
rejected their implicit argument that a lawyer should be employed only
by individuals. No doubt he considered, in rejecting the implicit argu-
ment, that the harmonies people create often become inharmonious, but
he nonetheless decided that his initial hope for their harmony was justi-
fied. This hope, I take it, inspired Hazard to suggest a legal ethic to
accomodate the harmony.73 The harmony assumed importance because
it rested in part on a common reality prior to the individuals with whom
Brandeis dealt-the same individuals who later quarreled and used the
law against one another-and in part on a hope for this common
reality. 74
Hazard understood from the Brandeis stories a coherent ethical ar-
gument about lawyers who are employed by groups, prototypically fami-
lies. I infer that, in Hazard's opinion, the argument from the Brandeis
stories was coherent enough to justify a new regulatory rule and a rea-
soned justification for the rule; the bar association politicians took it
72. Hazard suggests that one reason for the collapse of this attack on Brandeis was "conces-
sions from other reputable lawyers that they had often done exactly as Brandeis." G. HAZARD,
supra note 2, at 61. If Brandeis was wrong about "lawyering for the situation," then he certainly
violated the rules of professional conduct. "But if Brandeis was right, and the record of good practi-
tioners testifies to that conclusion, then what is required is not interdiction of 'lawyering for the
situation' but reexamination of what is meant by loyalty to the client." Id at 64.
73. See id. at 65 ("When a relationship between the clients is amenable to 'situation' treatment,
giving it that treatment is perhaps the best service a lawyer can render to anyone.").
74. Lawyering for the situation is thus different from lawyering for an individual client. It
provides no "structure of goals and constraints imposed from outside. The lawyer and the clients
must create that structure for themselves, with the lawyer being an active participant." Id. at 66.
This assertion is overstated to the extent that it fails to recognize that culture and tradition provide a
structure of goals and constraints. My argument here is not sentimental; it is anthropological. See
supra note 35. One of Iris Murdoch's fictional characters (Bradley Pearson) notices the structure of
culture and tradition in a doleful, almost Calvinist way.
The wicked regard time as discontinuous, the wicked dull their sense of natural causality.
The good feel being as a total dense mesh of tiny interconnections. My lightest whim can
affect the whole future. Because I smoke a cigarette and smile over an unworthy thought
another man may die in torment.
I. MURDOCH, THE BLACK PRINCE 98 (1973).
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from there.75 If the result is ambiguous, as I think it is, it is not because
the stories from Brandeis' life are ambiguous. Brandeis did not regret
being a family lawyer. Nor did he regret the hope he had for families.
He was, after all, by the time of the Senate hearings actively aware of his
Jewish heritage, and, in Israel, "[t]he family is the nursery of the race."'76
He also was involved then in the Zionist movement, and in the American
labor movement. 77 Both are things of families and of family metaphors.
Estate planning cases such as The Case of the Unwanted Will benefit
more from Brandeis' understanding that a lawyer can be, and often is, a
lawyer for the situation, than from the ABA's new regulatory rule, a
pale vestige of Brandeis' understanding. We can transfer our insights
from Brandeis' practice, and from what he said about it in retrospect, to
the story of John and Mary in the law office. If John's and Mary's cir-
cumstances constitute a problem or a quandary, then the solution sug-
gested by the Brandeis story is that Mary's secret purpose belongs in the
family. Being a family means taking purposes and secrets into account,
because being in a family means primarily that a person is known, even
before she knows. (Susan is known; that fact presents the issue in the
case.) The job of the lawyer for the family properly includes the descrip-
tion, in the language that is the law, of what a family knows, of what a
family is, of what this family is. The job involves skills the lawyer, when
young, may not have thought about-skills, though, that older lawyers
use and teach to the young.
In The Case of the Unwanted Will, the most irresponsible thing a
lawyer could do is to send either of these people to another lawyer, or
both of them to two other lawyers. If that is the command of our profes-
sional ethics, or even the easiest available "solution" to the case from our
regulatory rules, then our ethics and our rules are corrupting. They cor-
rupt the family in general, and this family in particular. A lawyer follow-
ing the rules is irresponsible because in fact, the family is the lawyer's
client. The lawyer who sends the family away is not able to respond to
his client. He is disabled by a false ethic and, and in trying to protect
himself, he harms his client. My argument rests on the conviction that a
family is something worth representing; the conviction is shown in, and
is the product of, the stories we tell about ourselves, including deep and
complex stories such as Anne Tyler's, and shallow and simple stories
such as those we see on television.
75. Hazard, the reporter to the A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards,
was, I think, the principal intellectual force behind the early drafts.
76. S. COHON, JUDAISM: A WAY OF LIFE 166 (1948).
77. See A. VORSPAN, GIANTS OF JUSTICE 26 (1960).
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In estate planning, and in much of business planning and corporate
representation (to mention only a few examples), lawyers are invited to
consider the changes that arise because members of families own things,
gather wealth from things, and then grow old and die. If the social order
is threatened by a disappearing moral consensus, or because our philoso-
phers have so ravaged our language that we no longer can describe our
moral consensus,78 and if our organic communities are made fragile by
the illusory promises of democratic liberalism, the result is not a world of
lonely individuals, but a world in which groups like families are on cul-
tural desert islands. As Robert N. Bellah and his colleagues describe this
perception, "the family is no longer an integral part of a larger moral
ecology tying the individual to community, church, and nation. The
family is the core of the private sphere, whose aim is not to link individu-
als to the public world but to avoid it as far as possible."' 79
Anne Tyler's most recent novel, Accidental Tourist, 0 demonstrates
Bellah's point. Macon's wife Sarah says to him: "If you could live any
way you wanted, I suppose you'd end up on a desert island with no other
human beings." Macon says that is not so: "I'd have you, and Ethan
[his son], and my sister and brothers." And Sarah says, "But no people.
I mean people there just by chance.""' Sarah was not looking through
the broken magnifying glass; Macon was. He knew he was not alone.
Collective isolation probably is not good politically, nor is it an ade-
quate premise for a professional ethic that ignores the realities of the
communities that we, in our communal isolations, have. These commu-
nities are what we present to our lawyers. Lawyers who are invited into
such (to use Brandeis' word) situations are invited into sacred places.
They are all the more sacred to the extent that these human harmonies
somehow survive in a commonwealth of strangers. The moral principle,
if we still need a principle after we see the reality, is that lawyers should
endeavor in such places not to make things worse.
I confess that this view of the world seems to disturb law students;8 2
it is, however, a view of things that brings nods of approval from the
older lawyers I meet in professional gatherings-lawyers who have more
experience than I or my students in ordinary, county-seat, Wednesday-
afternoon law practice. It is possible-although this is boasting-that
78. See, eg., A. MACINTYRE, supra note 4, at 1-5; J. WHITE, supra note 30, at 278-85; REvI-
SIONS, supra note 4, at 2-15.
79. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWINDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART 112 (1985) [hereinafter R. BELLAH].
80. A. TYLER, supra note 1.
81. Id. at 48-49.
82. See T. SHAFFER, TEACHER'S GUIDE TO AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS 81-84 (1985).
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the reason this perspective disturbs students is that it has moral sub-
stance for professional ethics, a subject that often has no substance ex-
cept as a branch of administrative or criminal law. It is also possible that
what is uncomfortable, in the family perspective on cases like The Case of
the Unwanted Will, is the realization that the issues we identify as we
discuss the morals of lawyers are sticky and uncertain. It is much easier
for a lawyer to behave as if he were a clerk in a driver's-license office
than to behave as someone who invites trust from families and then
charges by the hour for accepting it.
What perhaps makes a family perspective on the law office appeal-
ing is not its ideology, but its truthfulness.8 3 In estate planning, the fam-
fly-lawyer perspective on will making (and on corporate practice) is
relatively truthful because it takes account of the shared reality of death
seen with property, and property seen with death; that shared reality is
thus not a private fate or even an experience we need to talk about in the
singular. We cannot take it with us, but we need not die alone.
B. Values Destroyed by Death
I have used in my teaching of wills and trusts a remarkable article
from research psychology called Values Destroyed by Death.8 4 Diggory
and Rothman, the authors, asked several thousand people to choose from
among seven consequences of dying the one that seems most distasteful.
The consequence of my own death that seems to me most distaste-
ful is:
A. I could no longer have any experience.
B. I am uncertain as to what might happen to me if there is a life
after death.
C. I am afraid of what might happen to my body after death.
D. I could no longer care for my dependents.
E. My death would cause grief to my relatives and friends.
F. All my plans and projects would come to an end.
G. The process of dying might be painful. 85
83. Cf supra text following note 62 (discussing the consequences of a society's acceptance of
the untruthful ethics of autonomy). Bellah and his colleagues do not argue that Americans try to
regulate their lives according to the ethics of autonomy or even that they accept the suppositions that
lie behind liberal democratic political theory. See R. BELLAH, supra note 79. Instead, the connec-
tion between our traditions and the way we live our lives has faded, taking with it our power to
explain what we do. As a consequnce, we can use only sappy words such as "lifestyle," and fatuous
words such as "autonomy," to try to account for ourselves. These attempts at self-description and
self-justification fail because we do not know what we are doing.
84. Diggory & Rothman, Values Destroyed by Death, 63 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
205 (1961).
85. Id. at 205. I invite the reader to participate in this exercise. First, answer the question as if
you had been casually stopped on the street. Then answer the question again as if you were a client
talking to a lawyer about estate planning.
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Diggory and Rothman reported that, when stopped on the street, people
most often chose one of two answers:
A. I could no longer have any experience; and
E. My death would cause grief to my relatives and friends. 86
In talking with will clients and with the lawyers who work with
them I have found that there is a difference in answers to the question
when it is put to persons involved in estate planning. According to my
unscientific replication of the study, when people were thinking about
estate planning the top answers were:
D. I could no longer care for my dependents; and
F. All my plans and projects would come to an end.87
I conclude that this disparity is evidence of two shifts. First, the concern
about experiences becomes a concern for projects; the perspective
changes from such things as "the Aspen ski experience" to working. Sec-
ond, the concern for causing grief becomes a concern for the protection
of families through wills, trusts, and life insurance.
In both cases, working at estate planning is a way to look at death
and at property. The death of a property owner is not a private matter or
a matter of survival through things. It is, rather, a matter of survival
through those who are supported by work-usually (normally and nor-
matively) through a family. The "situation" that Brandeis discussed, 88
when seen in cases like The Case of the Unwanted Will, is a reality as
much as the people themselves. In fact, the family is the deepest and
most pervasive reality in social life.89
86. Id. at 206-09.
87. See T. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS 71-106 (1970).
88. See supra subpart IV(A).
89. The importance of the family even in modem social life is apparent in S. STOUFFER, COM-
MUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1963). Stouffer attempted to determine whether
there was in America a national anxiety over communism, using an elaborate polling procedure that
involved thousands of respondents and hundreds of interviewers. See id. at 15-19. The study found
little anxiety about communism, even in the days of Senator Joseph McCarthy's anticommunist
enterprise and the activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Id at 54-55. Less
than 1% of a sampling of Americans in several categories mentioned communism. Id. at 59, 68-70.
The greatest aggregation of worry was, as Anne Tyler would have predicted, about the family. Id at
59. 43% of the subjects said they were worried about personal matters that had to do with the
family, with family matters collectively described, or with family businesses. Id. at 60. The family
predominated in the responses that Stouffer quoted verbatim, even in those examples that were iden-
tified as personal (L., individual) by Stouffer. See id. at 60-65 (most of the responses he classified as
personal were related to support of dependents). Only 8% of Stouffer's respondents mentioned
world affairs, and of those, most of the answers reflected or included concern about what would
happen to members of the family in war. Id. at 8 1-82.
Stouffer's interview questions initially were open-ended, and then narrowed into the categories
that had provoked the study. Here are examples of Stouffer's questions:
3. What kinds of things do you worry most about?
985
Texas Law Review Vol. 65:963, 1987
V. The Influence of the Religious Tradition
A. Paternalism
There are trends in both popular and scholarly views of families.
The popular trends are evident, for example, in the movement over the
last generation to television situation comedies about black families and
away from series about doctors and lawyers, which in turn had replaced
series about towering pine trees and cowboys in saloons. Fashion and
change in fashion are evident among ethics scholars too-prominently
with regard to what has been said about paternalism.90
Paternalism, in most writing on the professions, is a bad word. But
pater (father) is not a bad word. The Hebraic religious tradition chose
and retains the word, if only as metaphor, to describe God, despite the
difficulty of a theology of patriarchy.91 The description approximates
with a family metaphor the understanding of the Hebrew prophets that
the God of Israel is a God with feelings-the "divine pathos," as Abra-
ham Joshua Heschel called it.92 God's pathos means that He feels as a
5. Are there other problems you worry or are concerned about, especially political or
world problems?
7 . ....
B. Were there other things? For example, did you talk about any dangers facing people
in the United States?
8. Here is a list of topics which have been discussed in the papers recently.
A. Which ones do you remember talking about with your friends in the last week or so?
1. Atom or hydrogen bombs
2. Communists in the United States
3. Crime and juvenile delinquency
4. Danger of World War III
5. Farm prices
6. High prices of things you buy
7. High taxes
8. Negro-white problems
9. Possibility of another depression
X. Threats to freedom in the United States
Y. None of these, don't know
B. Which one on that whole list seems most important to you?-whether you talked
about it or not.
C. Which one seems next most important?
Id. at 250.
Stouffer's study uncovered truths we do not see when we adopt the language of radical individu-
alism. See R. BELLAH, supra note 79, at 84 ("We find ourselves not independently of other people
and institutions but through them. We never get to the bottom of our selves on our own. We
discover who we are face to face and side by side with others in work, love, and learning.").
90. For sources evaluating paternalism in health care, see J. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DE-
CIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE (1982); W. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES
OF THE HEALER IN MEDICAL ETICS (1981).
91. See, eg., E. SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, IN MEMORY OF HER: A FEMINIST THEOLOGICAL
RECONSTRUCTION OF CHRISTIAN ORIGINS 53-56 (1985); Wire, Economics and Early Christian
Voices, 19 PAC. THEOLOGICAL REV. 15, 41-42 (1985).
92. A. HESCHEL, supra note 10, at 51 ("The ultimate is not a law but ajudge, not a power but a
father.").
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father feels; the prophetic response to God is thus sympathy.93 Father,
consequently, is not a bad word; it cannot be. Writers on professionalism
erred in thinking otherwise.
It is not a moral condemnation of standards of professional conduct,
then, to call them "fatherly" (paternalistic); nor would it be a moral con-
demnation to call them "motherly" (maternalistic) or even parent-like
(parentalistic). If we take our theological metaphors seriously, to analo-
gize behavior to the parental is to fit it to our traditions. The retreat
from parental metaphors in modern writing on professionalism is subject
to two criticisms. First, the analysis has not proceeded deeply enough;
writing on professionalism has been duped into announcing a moral prin-
ciple when it should have been concerned with description-truthful-
ness-in the comparison of a professional person and a parent, and of the
virtues of good parents and the failures of bad parents. Writing on pro-
fessionalism should describe the moral reasons that we use family meta-
phors, in theology and in professional life and it then should turn those
reasons into doctrine. Second, the condemnation of paternalism
(parentalism) in modern writing on ethics in the professions is the prod-
uct of the lonely-individual doctrine in philosophical ethics, and of the
philosophical distinction between fact and value, particularly in its dispo-
sition to turn the parental metaphor into a moral principle. 94
Radical individualism is the philosophy of an adolescent who wishes
he had no parents. The school of moral philosophy that posits a paren-
tless moral agent duped us into accepting an untruthful description of the
world. I notice that untruthful description in The Case of the Unwanted
Will, when legal-ethics commentators describe the woman making the
will as a radical individual rather than as a wife, a mother, and a member
of a family. The alternative is to understand enough about oneself and
one's client to know that family words describe more than a set of social
roles that a woman puts on as she might put on a hat.
The argument I make here is an argument from the Hebraic reli-
gious tradition. In Judaism, the family is not merely fundamental; it is
ordained. God dealt with the family; He made a covenant with it. Israel
is a family of families.95 This "master story" 96 has innumerable implica-
tions, some obvious and some subtle, for Hebraic norms on sex, raising
children, business and property, and inheritance. These implications
93. See id. at 116-24.
94. Paternalism in a narrow sense is consistent with the ethics of autonomy. See J. CHILDRESS,
supra note 90, at 8-10 (giving the example of a father who respects his children). The ethics of
autonomy speaks of these relationships in terms of freedom of choice.
95. See supra note 28.
96. See M. GOLDBERG, supra note 8; supra note 28.
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turn on the moral teaching that a person alone is not complete; as the
Midrash says, "He who lives without a wife lives without blessing, with-
out life, without joy, without help, without good, and without peace. '" 97
In Christianity, marriage is, in the Hebraic ethics of Jesus, so funda-
mental that it is sinful to dissolve it. 98 St. Paul's metaphors equate family
and church, and speak of the church as the body of Christ.99 The early
Christian church was a patriarchy that tried to be open to notions of
equality and partnership within the metaphor of family. 1°° That aspira-
tion was fundamentally Judaic: "[U]nity is a task.., to endure means to
be one."' 01
There are two ways to take account of the religious tradition in
American legal ethics. One way is to note that the cultural deposits of
most American lawyers include the religious tradition. Failing to take
account of the tradition therefore is failing to be truthful. As Peter Ber-
ger put it, "The very least that a knowledge of religious traditions has to
offer is a catalogue of heresies for possible home use." 102 That is, the
religious tradition, when we are conscious of it, helps to keep us from
repeating obvious moral mistakes and, more profoundly, it influences our
behavior when we are not conscious of it. Berger thought that these in-
fluences were appropriate: "[I]n everyday life it is just as important that
some things can silently be taken for granted as that some things are
reaffirmed in so many words."10 3 In that sense, law-office behavior prob-
ably rests on religious tradition in an ordinary and everyday way. The
risk in Berger's reassurance, as Robert Bellah and his colleagues recently
demonstrated, is that we will lose or distort influences that we do not
bring into the light and make sense of."04 The work of bringing moral
influences into the light and making sense of them is the purpose of the
discipline of ethics.
Muddled thinking about conflicts of interest in estate planning and
in legal work for associations that account for themselves with the meta-
phor of family illustrates Bellah's point. This muddled thinking is like
Gerald Dworkin's analysis of Sartre's World War II French patriot.10 5
The patriot had to choose (as Sartre saw it) whether to stay at home in a
97. OUR MASTERS TAUGHT: RABBINIC STORIES AND SAYINGS 87 (J. Petuchowski trans. &
ed. 1982) (quoting Midrash Tehillim LIX).
98. See I Corinthians 7:10-11.
99. See Ephesians 5:21-33.
100. See Norquist, Family Dynamics in the Bible, SEASONS, Summer 1984, at 3, 3.
101. A. HESCHEL, supra note 10, at 102-03.
102. P. BERGER, A RUMOR OF ANGELS 78 (1969).
103. Id. at 36.
104. See supra note 83.
105. Dworkin, supra note 46, at 159-60.
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country occupied by the German army to care for his aged mother, or to
join the Free French abroad. Sartre saw the story as posing a prototypi-
cal dilemma in the ethics of autonomy; he argued that the patriot had to
choose what to do, and that the morals governing choice were morals
because the patriot chose them.106 Dworkin said that the dilemma ex-
isted only because of deeper moral realities: the family, and a nation that
demanded patriotism. 107 To dispose of either of those realities is to dis-
pose of the dilemma.
In The Case of the Unwanted Will, to dispose of the family in the
will client's life, so that her relationship with her former daughter-in-law
is a human harmony that stands independent of a larger harmony, is to
eliminate the dilemma. She then will make her will alone; indeed she will
probably not visit the office with her husband in the first place. To dis-
pose of her continuing attachment to this other woman who in the law is
no longer her daughter, is to say that she will accept the will that has
been drafted for her. In either of those situations it would not occur to
anybody that the law-office routine had anything moral about it. But, of
course, and in any case, it does have something moral about it. Bellah's
point is that we will lose the force of that reality if we lose the words to
make ourselves aware of it. And as we lose the force of the reality of our
harmonies, we lose the skill for seeing them in extraordinary cases, in, as
Brandeis and Fletcher said, situations.108
The second way to take account of the religious tradition in legal
ethics is not as a contribution to liberal democracy or a corrective to
radical individualism, but as a radical alternative. As Stanley Hauerwas
put it in reference to Christians, Christians should
be the sort of people and community that can become a real option
and provide for real confrontation for others. Unless such a com-
munity exists, then no real option exists. The manner of providing
such an option, moreover, entails that Christians go to every land
and every people in the hope that they can elicit a real confronta-
tion on matters that matter.109
An interesting and parallel statement about Judaism could be made here,
one that would show how Jews also provide an alternative to the
world,110 and how the Christian witness and evangelism to which
106. J. SARTRE, Existentialism, in EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMAN EMOTIONS 24 (1957).
107. Dworkin, supra note 46, at 160.
108. See supra Part IV(A).
109. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 8, at 105.
110. See M. BUBER, ON JUDAISM, supra note 8, at 124-25, 211; see also L. HARRIS, supra note
65 (Harris' narrative account of the religious lifestyle of a Hasidic family from Brooklyn, New York,
presenting one example of a Jewish alternative in the world).
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Hauerwas alludes has its roots in Israel, and in Jesus of Nazareth's life
and death in a Jewish family.
Either account of the religious tradition's influence in legal ethics
affirms the reality of the family metaphor: God is not a premise; He is
the Father.'
I do not argue that one of these ways is as useful for legal ethics as
the other. If I were to compare them, I would argue that only the latter
view, the religious tradition explicated not as a corrective but as a radical
alternative in the world of lawyers, is adequate. But either view identifies
the religious tradition in ordinary, Wednesday-afternoon law practice. 11 2
Both ways show the fundamental importance of family to an adequate
legal ethic in the culture of modern American lawyers.
The example I have used is an estate planning example. Estate plan-
ning is seen as family based rather more easily than personal injury
claims or securities registration; in fact the irony of most writing about
ethics in estate planning is that it describes family situations (as The Case
of the Unwanted Will does), or encounters an association that wants to
think of itself as a family, and then resolves them without reference to the
family they claim and come from and go back to. Putting the family
back into ethical discussion-finding it where it is or where it claims it
wants to be -among lawyers would be, even in the most modest cata-
logue-of-heresies use of the religious tradition, a matter of describing
what goes on. A radical use of Hebraic religious tradition would cut
more deeply, affect more globally, and disturb profoundly. For that rea-
son, even we believers do not like to think about it.
B. A Biblical Estate Planning Story
Judah was under siege by the powerful armies of Babylon. God told
the prophet Jeremiah, and Jeremiah told Judah, that Jerusalem would
fall and be destroyed and its people taken away in captivity. Jeremiah's
countrymen imprisoned him for telling them about the fate of Judah.
God then ordered Jeremiah to buy a piece of land-or, rather, to exercise
his legal right to redeem land that had belonged to his uncle. Jeremiah
obeyed: He paid for the land, obtained the deed from his cousin, and had
the deed witnessed by his fellow inmates. Jeremiah then ordered his sec-
retary, Baruch, to
Ill. See H. THEILICKE, BETWEEN GOD AND SATAN 40 (1958); see also M. BUBER, I AND
THOU, supra note 8, at 129 ("[WMhat confronts us immediately and first and always... can only be
addressed, not asserted.").
112. See, eg., Jones, Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL. L. REv.
957, 975 (1978).
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take these copies of the deed of purchase, the sealed and the un-
sealed, and deposit them in an earthenware jar so that they may be
preserved for a long time. For these are the words of the Lord of
Hosts the God of Israel: The time will come when houses, fields,
and vineyards will again be bought and sold in this land. 113
In this story, the symbol of the covenant that God will renew with
His people, when He will "plant them in this land," is a Wednesday-
afternoon legal transaction within a family. The transaction will lay
proved in an earthenware jar until the family-the family, not the par-
ties, who will all be dead by then-will come back to Jerusalem.
113. Jeremiah 32:1-25 (New English Bible).
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